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1905-1910.
There has been of, recent years a great deal of criticism of
courts and trials in court in this country; and a feeling of dis-
satisfiction with the law, and especially the criminal law, and the
administration thereof seems to have become quite prevalent. It
has been asserted that the administration of criminal law in cer-
tain foreign countries and particularly in England is more effi-
cient than in the United States. It has often been alleged that
both our criminal laws themselves and their administration in this
country are radically defective and inefficient. These criticisms,
however, have been made in broad general terms, not purporting
to have been based on investigation but on general impressions
merely; or a sweeping criticism has been based on some one and
perhaps very exceptional instance. The lack of any adequate
criminal statistics in this country makes it difficult to judge
whether such criticisms are well founded, or, if they are, whether
the causes of the conditions complained of are what they would
seem, on first impression, to be. It is a matter of some import-
ance, therefore, to determine by careful and accurate investiga-
tion just what is the state of the administration of our criminal
law and what are the causes of the conditions which are found
to exist so that remedies may be sought for such defects as there
really are and, even more important still, so that radical changes
may not be made which will be productive of additional evils
while not correcting such as we already have. This can only be
accomplished by detailed investigations of various subjects within
the field of criminal law in the different states and jurisdictions
of the country. Such studies are laborious and difficult to make
with even an approach to thoroughness and accuracy but the need
for them would seem to be apparent. It is as a slight contribution
toward such studies that this examination of the appeals in
homicide cases in Pennsylvania from 1905 to 19IO has been
undertaken.
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The five year period from January I, 1905, to January i,
i9io, was selected as affording a sufficient number of cases on
which to base conclusions and still not too large a number for
convenient study and as reflecting present conditions. In Penn-
sylvania all appeals in homicide cases are to the Supreme Court;
appeals in all other criminal cases are to the Superior Court. The
cases studied, therefore, embrace all the criminal cases in the
Supreme Court for the period selected, except on appeals from
the Superior Court. The cases include all homicide cases decided
by the court within this period. The information obtained is
tabulated for convenient examination in Table Ia. The title of
the case, county, and the book and page of the Pennsylvania
Reports where the case is reported are given for reference. The
next column gives the briefest ihdication of the question involved
in the appeal. The next shows whether the case was affirmed
or reversed. The following columns show, in order, the date
the act charged was committed, the date of the arrest, the date
of the trial, the date of the appeal, the date the case was argued
in the Supreme Court and the date the opinion was handed down.
Thus we have a chronological history of each case, so far as the
information could be obtained, from the commission of the
offense to the decision on the appeal. The remaining columns
give the length of time consumed by the trial and the time which
elapsed from the arrest to trial, from trial to appeal, from appeal
to the argument and from the argument to the decision, calcu-
lated from the dates in the preceding columns. The date of the
argument and of the opinion was obtained from the Reports; the
other dates from the records, in most instances through the clerks
of the Courts of Quarter Sessions in the various counties. In
the greater number of cases the clerks very obligingly furnished
the information asked for. In a few instances in which no
response to letters of inquiry could be obtained from the clerks
I am indebted to brother members of the Bar for looking up the
information for me and particularly to Mr. W. W. Smithers, who
furnished me the data in the Philadelphia cases. The informa-
tion is complete so far as obtainable. In some cases the desired
a Seo infra, p. 626.
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information could not be obtained because the docket did not
show it and the original papers were mislaid or lost.
Altogether there were fifty-three appeals within the period.
Of these forty-three were affirmed and ten reversed, the reversals
being less than one in five or nineteen per cent. of the cases. Three
of the reversed cases, those of Johnson (213 Pa.,607), Curcio and
Deitrick were again appealed after the second trial. The John-
son and Curcio cases were affirmed on the second appeal and the
Deitrick case again reversed.
The most difficult information to get in connection with
these cases was the length of time consumed by the trial. Some-
times the minute dockets would show it clearly and sometimes
they would not. However it was ascertained for thirty-seven
of the cases. In only one of these cases did the trial exceed
eight days. This was the case of Danz in Philadelphia which
took nineteen days to try. This however was an unusual case. It
was the trial of a wife on a charge of murdering her husband
by arsenical poisoning. The decedent died in I9OI and the arrest
was not made until two years later. There was much expert
testimony and numerous questions of evidence. The case comes
within this period by reason of a re-argument being had, after
which the judgment was affirmed by a divided court. The case
is so exceptional I have thought best not to include it for any
statistical purpose. There remain then thirty-six cases in which
we have the time taken by the trial. These are shown in Table
lIb. No account was taken of fractions of a day. As the table
shows, the average length of these trials was less than four days.
A case more frequently took four days to try than any other
number as is shown in Figure I, in which the upper line represents
the number of days laid off inca series and the lower line the
number of cases which were tried in each number of the days'
series. This is also shown graphically in Figure 2, in which the
number of days is laid off on the base line, the perpendiculars
representing the number of cases. The curve representing the
length of the trials rises quite uniformly to four days and then
falls very abrubtly to six days. Only eleven cases took more than
four days to try and only five more than five days. Over half the
bSee in !ra, p. 640.
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cise3 -ere tried in three days or less and two-thirds in four days
or less.
One column of Table I contains a calculation of the number
of days from arrest to trial and this is also tabulated for con-
venient reference in Table 11W . We have this data for forty-four
cases. The Danz case has been omitted from this table as
previously noted and also the Hine case as that also seems ex-.
ceptional, the delay in bringing that case to trial being due ap-
parently to an absconding witness. The average time from arrest
to trial is 112 days or sixteen weeks One-fourth of the cases
were tried within two months after the arrest one-half within
three months and a half and two-thirds within four months. Of
the remaining third, three cases are from Philadelphia and one
from Pittsburgh. The longest time that elapsed was 46 weeks.
Table IVd summarizes the time from trial to appeal. The
case of Leskoski has been omitted from this table as exceptional.
The defendant was tried January 13, 19o4. On March 20, 1904,
lie broke jail and was at large until February 22, x99, when he
was returned from Butte, Montana. We have the data under
this head for forty-eight cases. The average length of time that
elapsed was 129 days or something over four months. One-
third of the. cases were appealed within two months from the
trial, one-half within three months and a half and two-thirds
within five months. This period in the main indicates the length
of time consumed in the consideration of a motion for a new trial
because the appeal in order to be a supersedeas even in a capital
case, must be taken within three weeks from the entry of ibe
sentence.' The Act of March 31, i86o, usually referred.to as the
penal code, by sec. 33, gaveall persons indicted in the Quarter
Sessions or any county court of Oyer and Terminer the right
to remove the indictment and all proceedings thereon into the
Supreme Court by certiorari or writ of error but only on special
allowance by the Supreme Court or a justice thereof. Sec. 57
of the same act gave the defendant in an indictment for murder
or voluntary manslaughter the right to a bill of exceptions to the
decision of the trial court on any point of evidence or law and a
writ of error thereon after conviction and sentence; but by-section
59 such writ could only issue on special allowance made upon
'Coin. v. 1Hil, i8s Pa. 385.
c See infra, p. 641.
d See infra, P. 64r.
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application within thirty days after sentence. By Act of Feb.
15, 187o, however, a writ of error was made of right in cases of
murder and voluntary manslaughter and as to all cases of
felonious homicide a review by the Supreme Court is made a
constitutional right by sec. 24 of article 5 of the Constitution of
1874. At that time the statutory, limitation for writs of error
was two years but by Act of March 24, 1877, it was provided that
no writ should issue in such cases after twenty days from sen-
tence unless specially allowed by the Supreme Court or a judge
thereof. The Act of May i9, 1897, provided a complete system
of appeals to the Supreme and Superior Courts and placed ap-
peals in criminal cases on the same footing as those in civil
cases with respect to the period of limitation so that under that
act appeals in criminal cases, including capital cases, are allowed
as of right within six months from the entry of sentence but do not
operate as a supersedeas unless taken out within three weeks
from sentence.
2
It may be assumed that a motion for a new trial will always
be made in a murder case because that is the only method of re-
examining questions relating to sufficiency and weight of evi-
dence, etc. All modes of reviewing cases in our appellate courts
are now called appeals, as was provided by Act of May 9, 1889;
but it was held that under that act the same modes of writ of
error, certiorari and appeal still remain applicable in the same
kinds of cases, within the same limits and the same effect as be-
fore, the only difference being that now they are called by the
same name.3 In addition to the provision of the Act of i86o,
above quoted, in relation to exceptions to any decision of the trial
court upon any point of evidence or law and writs of error there-
on, the Act of May i, 1874, provided for an exception by the de-
fendant to any decision of the court "in the same manner as is
provided and practiced in civil cases." Under these acts, how-
ever, the Supreme Court is limited to a review of such rulings on
points of law or evidence as were excepted to-at the time and
made part of the record and it is incumbent on the appellant to
'Comw. v. Hill, supra.
' Rand v. King, 134 Pa. 641.
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show that errors were in fact committed.4 The Supreme Court
cannot review matters which, prior to these acts, had rested
solely in the discretion of the trial court, as, for example, the
granting or refusing of a new trial.5 It is true the Act of Feb.
15, 1870, provides that in all cases of murder in the first degree
removed into the Supreme Court, "it shall be the duty of the
judges thereof to review both the law and the evidence, and to
determine whether the ingredients necessary to'constitute murder
in the first degree shall have been proved to exist; and if not so
proved, then to reverse the judgment and send the same back
for a new trial, or to enter such judgment as the laws of this
Commonwealth require." But it has been held that this does
not empower the court to review the question of the guilt or in-
nocense of the defendant; the appellate court can only determine
whether competent evidence was given in the case, which, if be-
lieved by the jury, would furnish the elements, or "ingredients,"
as the act says, of murder in the first degree.6 "It is only when,
from undisputed evidence, but one finding can follow and a jury
reaches a different one, that a court must interfere and avert
injustice by setting the verdict aside."'7  The appeal to the
Supreme Court therefore is a review only of legal questions and
as to whether there was produced competent evidence of the ele-
ments of murder in the first degree. As to many matters, there-
fore, the decision of the trial court on a motion for a new trial
is final and the full responsibility remains with the trial court.
This may account for the length of time apparently taken in dis-
posing of motions for a new trial in capital cases, as shown by
our table.
The rules of the Supreme Court provide as follows: "The
first Monday of each month shall be a special return-day in each
district for all appeals in cases of conviction and sentence of death
for murder of the first degree. The fifth Monday after issuing
the writ shall be assigned for the argument thereof; Provided,
'Fife v. Comw., 29 Pa. 429; Taylor v. Comw., 44 Pa. i3i; Cathcart v.
Comw., 37 Pa. ioS; Johnson v. Comw., ii5 Pa. 369.
'Alexander v. Comw., 105 Pa. i.
'Grant v. Comw., 7i Pa. 495; Comw. v. Morrison, 193 Pa. 613; Comw.
v. Bubnis, i97 Pa. 542.
' Comw v. Danz, 211 Pa. 507.
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The court shall then be in session in any district. If then in
session in a district other than that in which the writ issued, the
prothonotary issuing such writ shall certify the record to the
district in which the court shall be sitting. If the court shall not
be in session at that time, the case shall be certified to the dis-
trict in which the next term shall be held. Capital cases shall be
placed at the head of the list for argument." We would, there-
fore, expect the larger number of cases to be urged within six
weeks of the taking of the appeal although in a good many cases
the time might be expected to be four and even five months on ac-
count of the fact that the Supreme Court does not sit to hear
arguments after May until October. Appeals taken in May or
June therefore would not be argued before the next October. The
data, which we have for forty-nine of the cases is summarized
in Table V e.In only two cases does the time run over five months.
The average time is about nine weeks; and two-thirds of the cases
were argued within this time. In one-half of the cases the
time was less than approximately seven weeks.
Table VF summarizes the time from the argument to the
decision by the Supreme Court. Omitting only the Danz case, we
have this data for fifty-two cases. The average time was thirty
days. One-half the cases were decided within three weeks and
two-thirds within five weeks. The longest time that elapsed be-
fore the decision was eleven weeks.
From the figures given it appears that the average time that
elapses from the arrest of the defendant to the decision of his
appeal by the Supreme Court in capital cases is a little over eleven
months. A little over three months of this time is consumed by
the appeal, eight months being the average time elapsing from the
arrest to the appeal. No calculation of the time from the date
of the act charged to the arrest was made as in the great majority
of cases the arrest was either on the same day or but a few days
later. While eleven months is the average time elapsed it should
be noted that approximately two-thirds of the cases do not run
to this length; the smaller number of protracted cases have made
the average time so long.
The object of this paper is to set forth the facts and data
in regard to these appeals rather than to draw conclusions from
e See infra, p. 642.
f See infra, p. 642.
632 APPEALS IN HOMICIDE CASES IN PENNSYLVANIA
them. A few comments, however, may be made. It would seem
that the average murder case is tried in three or four days.
Probably considerable time is consumed in every murder case in
getting a jury and in all of these cases there was enough of a
legal question involved on which to base an appeal. The average
time from arrest to trial seems somewhat long from the stand-
point of speedy justice as a desideratum. Outside of the cities
of Philadelphia and Pittsburgh the grand juries are in session
only once in three months and considerable time might frequently
elapse after an arrest before an indictment could be sent before
a grand jury. In many cases, of course, there might be good rea-
sons for some delay of the trial subsequent to the indictment.
From the figures which we have, however, it would seem that trial
is more apt to be delayed in the large cities than in the country
districts. "The length of time el4psing from trial to appeal seems
excessive. It was suggested that the length of time is due to the
consideration of motions for new trial and the care taken in their
consideration, the decision on such motion being the final decision
on practically all except purely legal questions. Nevertheless an
average of over four months seems unnecessarily long. In
practice the argument of the appeal does not seem to take place
as speedily as is contemplated by the rules of the Supreme Court;
presumably, however, this must be due to sufficient reasons in each
case. In view of the fact that it is the duty of the Supreme Court
to examine the evidence, the disposition of appeals by that court
may be fairly characterized as prompt, the average being thirty
days. Here too it should be noted that two-thirds of the cases
are decided practically within the average period.
In this connection something may be said of the legal ques-
tions on which these appeals were based. We may look first at the
reversed cases. In the Fellows case the trial judge instructed the
jury that he did not deem it necessary to define murder of the
second degree for the reason that under the testimony the verdict
should be murder of the first degree or not guilty. This was held
to be error on the ground that the Act of Assembly provides
that "the jury before whom any person indicted for murder shall
be tried, shall, if they find such person guilty thereof, ascertain
in their verdict whether it be murder of the first or second de-
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gree." In the case of Johnson, 213 Pa., 607, the reversal was for
the admission in evidence of the statement of a third party, made
in the defendant's presence but denied by him; and of testimony
of the finding of bloody clothing a mile from the scene of the
murder with no evidence to connect the clothing with the prisoner
or the crime. The case of Frucci was reversed because of the
inadvertent statement in the charge to the jury that "you will
have to do in this case with that kind of murder stated in the
statute as wilful, deliberate and premeditated murder" and which
might have been misunderstood by the jury on the question of de-
gree and the case of Ieradi because of a too strict application in the
charge of the maxim "falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus." In the
case of Curcio the trial judge instructed that there was no evi-
dence in the case on which they could convict of manslaughter.
This was held error. In the Deitrick case the defense was ac-
cidental killing. On the first appeal the case was reversed be-
cause the trial judge had instructed the jury "that the burden
is upon the defendant to convince you beyond a reasonable doubt
that the killing-of the deceased was purely accidental." On the
second trial the court below instructed the jury that they should
determine by the preponderance of the evidence the question of
whether the killing was accidental. The case was again reversed
because this instruction also deprived the defendant of the benefit
of any reasonable doubt on the question, to which he was en-
titled. The ground of reversal in the case of Cate was erroneous
instruction as to the effect of evidence of good character. In the
case of Fisher certain letters from the defendant to his wife were
received in evidence and this was held to contravene the prohibi-
tion against the wife testifying against the husband. In the Smith
case the jury, after discussing the case for four hours and a half,
came into court and asked for additional instructions on the ques-
tion of premeditation. Four questions were asked the trial
judge, three of which he declined to answer, observing that he
had "already referred to that matter at great length in my
charge." This was held to be reversible error, the court saying,
"the purpose of instructions given by the court is to explain fully
and clearly to the jury the law applicable to the facts of the case
under consideration and when the trial judge has not succeeded
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in delivering instructions on the law in such way that they will
be understood by the jury, his charge is inadequate and justly open
to objection by the defendant. * * * Until the jury had been fully
advised and understood the law upon the question of premedita-
tion as applicable to the case, the instructions were inadequate and
it was the duty of the court, upon the request of the jury, to give
additional instructions."
In five of these cases, those of Johnson, Deitrick, Fisher and
Smith, the error complained of would seem to be clear. In the
other and especially the Cate and Curcio cases the ground of re-
versal would seem to be rather narrow. It is evident that the
reversed cases were carefully considered. Six of them are among
the one-third in which the time from argument to decision was
longer than the average; in the Curcio case it was the longest of
all.
The largest number of assignments of error seem to be to
the admission or rejection of evidence, as is perhaps natural.
Almost as many are criticisms of portions of the judge's charge
or of his answers to requests to charge. In many, especially of the
latter class, the criticisms are captious and the errors alleged
trivial. In one case the Supreme Court said: "A sense of pro-
fessional duty, always commendable, but in the present case
scarcely warranted by the facts, has impelled the learned counsel
for appellant to bring to the consideration of this court nineteen
assignments of error." And in another case it is said that "not
a single one of the twelve assignments of error has any merit at
all, substantial or even technical, and it is to be regretted that
counsel feel themselves at liberty to impede and delay the cause
of justice on such trifling grounds." In a third case the court
said: "No assignment of error has any merit or excuses bringing
this case here." The doctrine of "harmless error" seems well
established in Pennsylvania. The prisoner must show that a
substantial error was committed on the trial by which he has been
injured; it is not sufficient that an abstract or technical error
has taken place. 8 In the Fisher case it is said: "It has been said
in several of our cases that courts will not be astute to sustain
'Fife v. Com-w., 29 Pa. 429.
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technical assignments of error in homicide cases where from a
consideration of the whole record it appears no substantial in-
justice was done the defendant and that a fair trial on the merits
had been accorded him. This must not be understood to mean,
however, that courts are at liberty to disregard established rules
of procedure, or settled rules of evidence, or the constitutional
and statutory-rights of parties, in the trial of such cases."
Quite a number of the errors alleged relate to the degree of
the crime under the facts proved and three of the cases involve
evidence of intoxication as affecting the degree. Insanity as a
defense figures in six of our cases. In the Hallowell case it was
said that in order to make out a defense on this ground it must
be shown that the mind of the defendant, at the time he com-
mitted the act, was so affected by disease that he did not know the
nature and consequence of it, that he did not know that it was
wrong and would be punished by law, or that he was so impelled
by an impulse that he had no power whatever of resisting; and
in the Lewis case that the law is that whether the insanity be
general or partial the degree of it must be so great as to have
controlled the will of its subject and to have taken from him the
freedom of moral action. In the Renzo case it was said that the
law of Pennsylvania has never tolerated nor is likely to tolerate
a doctrine of "transitory frenzy" as a defense to murder. In
the eye of the law it is nothing but vindictive and reckless tem-
per. In each of the six cases there was a conviction of murder in
the first degree which was affirmed on appeal. -
There are few questions of procedure. In only one case was
any question raised as to the indictment. This was the Mallini
case in which a motion was made at the trial to quash the indict-
ment for insufficiency of the information made before the
Justice of the Peace on which the warrant was issued and the re-
fusal of the trial court to quash was assigned as error. The
Supreme Court held that the objection to the information was too
late and that the indictment being regularly found after a hear-
ing before a justice could not be invalidated for any such reason.
The Act of March 3, i86o, provided: "Every indictment shall be
deemed and adjudged sufficient and good in law which charges
the crime substantially in the language of the act of the Assembly
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prohibiting the crime and prescribing the puinshment, if any
such there be, or, if at common law, so plainly that the nature of
the offence charged may be easily understood by the jury. Every.
objection to any indictment for any formal defect apparent on
the face thereof, shall be taken by demurrer, or on motion to
quash such indictment before the jury shall be sworn, and not
afterward; and every court before whom any such objection shall
be taken for any formal defect, may, if it be thought necessary,
cause the indictment to be forthwith amended in such particular
by the clerk or other officer of the court, and thereupon the trial
shall proceed[as if no such defect appeared." Provision was also
made in the same act, which is commonly referred to as the
Penal Code, in case of variance between the indictment and the
evidence, for amending the indictment on the trial in regard to
the name or description of any person, matter or thing whatso-
ever if the court shall consider such variance not material to the
merits of the case; and it was further provided as follows: "In
any indictment for murder or manslaughter, it shall not be neces-
sary to set forth the manner in which, or the means by which
the death of the deceased was caused, but it shall be sufficient,
in every indictment for murder to charge that the defendant did
feloniously, wilfully and of his malice aforethought, kill and
murder the deceased; and it shall be sufficient in every indictment
for manslaughter, to charge that the defendant did feloniously
kill and slay the deceased." In the Report on the Penal Code it
was said with reference to these provisions, "Sections I I to 22
are all new and are, certainly, not the least improvement in the
proposed amendments of our penal system. The history of
criminal administration abounds with instances in which the
guilty have escaped, by reason of the apparently umeasonable
nicety required in indictments. Lord Hale, one of the best, and
most humane of English judges, long since remarked, that such -
niceties were "grown to be a blemish and an inconvenience in the
law, and the administration thereof; that more offenders escaped
by the easy ear given to exceptions to indictments than by the
manifestations of their innocence and that the grossest crimes
had gone unpunished by reason of these unseemly niceties." The
i ith section of this Act proposes what the commissioners believe
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will be an effective remedy to this reproach of the common law,
without depriving the accused of any proper privilege; it leaves
him, at the outset of his trial to determine whether he will ques-
tion the relevancy of his accusation or take issue on the merits
of the charge; if he elects the latter and is condemned there seems
neither moral nor legal fitness in permitting him to urge formal
exceptions, which, if suggested at an early period, would have
been promptly corrected. The 12th and 13th sections are in-
tended to meet cases of frequent occurrence, in which, although
an indictment is strictly formal, yet, owing to some accidental
slip in its preparation, it is found on the trial, that the proofs do
not entirely tally with the description of the instrument set forth
in the indictment, or in the names of persons or places described
therein. In the case of Commonwealth v. Gillespie, 7 S. & R.,
469, a mistake in spelling the name of 'Burrall' which in the
indictment was spelled Burrill was adjudged fatal after verdict.
So a variance between the names of the persons aggrieved and
the places described in the indictment and the proofs thereof on
the trial will entitle the defendant to an acquittal, on the ground
of the want of agreement between the allegata and the probata.
The proposed sections authorize the courts to amend such verbal
errors, if objected to; and thus terminate a class of technical
niceties which are a reproach to the rational administration of
justice." These statutory provisions have been construed in
numerous cases and their meaning well settled and it is believed
few cases now arise on these questions. They are practically
identical with similar provisions of the English statute of 14 &
15 Victoria. 9 Exceptions of course lie, under the acts before
quoted, to the ruling of the court in refusing to quash or in
overruling a demurrer to an indictment and such action of the
court may be reviewed by the defendant on appeal after verdict.
The defendant cannot, however, have it reviewed before verdict.
The Supreme Court possesses all the supervisory powers of the
King's Bench in criminal proceedings, and when it is made to ap-
pear that a fair trial cannot be had, a pending indictment may
be removed into the Supreme Court by certiorari and that court
' See Lawson and Keedy, "Criminal Procedure in England," i Jour. Crim.
Law and Criminology, 604.
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may either delegate one of its own judges to try it or may send
it to another county for trial. 10 But such powers do not extend
to reviewing the action of the court in overruling demurrers or
refusing to quash indictments." For quashing an indictment, how-
ever, or other errors apparent on the record such as arresting
judghent after verdict and the like, the Commonwealth- may re-
move the 'record for review and without special allowance. 12
In only two cases was any question raised as to the drawing
of the juries and in both instances the objection was regarded as
having no merit. In four cases errors were alleged in regard
to challenges of jurors, none of which allegations were sustained.
In the Spahr case several jurors were challenged for cause be-
cause of opinions formed and expressed by them and the chal-
lenges were overruled. The Supreme Court held that even if
the court had erred in this regard, as the prisoner did not exhaust
his peremptory challenges the acceptance of the jurors did him
no injury. It was said that the established test as to whether a
juror should be rejected for an opinion formed is whether or not
he can throw aside his impression or opinion and render an
impartial verdict on the evidence alone; and in the Minney case
it was said that even if the juror had a "fixed opinion" he was
not disqualified if he was able to disregard it.
In the Ezell case complaint was made of improper remarks
of the district attorney in summing up to the jury. The Supreme
Court said: "The arguments of counsel to the jury are not as-
signable as error. They are under the supervision and control
of the judge, who is not bound to give attention to them unless
called upon to do so. If the district attorney's remarks can be
made the subject of exception, then so must be those of the de-
fendant's counsel, and the appellate court would be asked to re-
view the trial, not on the evidence but on the talk. When counsel
misstate facts or material evidence, or resort to comment unfair
or unduly prejudicial to the other side, it is the duty of the op-
"Comw. v. Balph, iii Pa. 365; Comw. v. Smith, 185 Pa. 553; Comw. v.
Fletcher, 208 Pa. 137.
"Quay's Petition, 189 Pa. 517.
n Heikes v. Comw., 26 Pa. 513; Comw. v. Wallace, 114 Pa. 4o5; Comw. v.
Sober, 15 Pa. Sup. Ct. 520.
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posing counsel at once to call the attention of the court to the
matter, and the action of the court may then become the subject
of exception. In general it is matter of discretion and reviewable
only for abuse." The trial judge frequently takes part in the
examination of witnesses and especially in the preliminary ex-
amination of jurors. The case of Curcio, 218 Pa., 327, is an in-
stance of this; and in the Shults case the Supreme Court refused
to reverse for a very decided expression of opinion by the judge
as to the value of certain testimony.
As before noted, the appeal is not a review on the facts but
only of questions of law; as to the facts, the verdict of the jury
is final, subject only to the power of the trial court to grant a new
trial in proper cases.
The foregoing comments are intended only to call attention
to a few points suggested by the data and cases herewith col-
lected. It is hoped that this data may be found useful in the
study of many questions relating to the administration of the
criminal law.
Edward Lindsey.
Warren, Pa.
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TABLE II.
Time of Trial.No. Cases. D
4 .............. .........
5 ......................
7 .........................
9............. .........
6 ............................
2 ................. ...........
I ............................
2 ..... ..... ..................
36 Total days ............. I
Days- I
ICases- 4
FIG. I.
5 7 9 6
FIG. 2.
ays.
I
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
:36
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TABLE III.
Arrest to Trial.
No. Cases. Time.
...................... 13 days.
I....................... 23
3 ...................... 24
I ...................... 26 "
I ........................ 29
I ........................ 44 "
I ........................ 51
I ...................... 52
I ...................... 58 '5 -
I ...................... 6o "
I ...................... 72 "
I ........................ 74 "
2 ......................... 8o "
1........................ 83 cc
...................... 87 "
I...................... 91 
....................... 93 cc
I...................... 103 "
...................... 104 c
...................... 107 (
I......................109 c
I...................... 0 I (
I........................ 114
I...................... X15 c
I...................... I8 cc
I...................... 124 c
...................... 129 i
...................... 140 cc
I...................... 144 cc
...................... 146 "
I...................... 155 "
I...................... 157 "
...................... 165
...................... 109
I ...................... 172
I ...................... 194 "
I ...................... 210 cc
I ...................... 219
I ...................... 230
I ...................... 305
I...................... 322
44 Total days ....... 4949
TABLE IV.
From Trial to Appeal.
No. Cases. Time.
I ........................ 21 days.
I ...................... 31 cc
I ...................... 32 "
I.......................40 cc
I ...................... 4'
I ........................ 44 cc
I ........................ 45 "
I. ....................... 49
I ........................ 5
2 ...................... 50
I ...................... 54
2....................... 54
I ........................ 57
2 ...................... 67
.2 ...... "....... ..... 67
2 ....................... 91 "
I ........................ 92 "
I...................... 94 "
I ...................... 94 "c
I ...................... 102 cc
I ...................... 102
i ...................... 119
I ...................... 125
I ...................... 26 "
I ...................... 14 "
I ...................... 142 cc
I......................... 149
I ...................... 142
I ...................... 55
I ...................... 178 "
I. ....................... 183 "
I ...................... 183 cc
I ...................... 191 "
I ...................... 203 c
I ...................... 209 c
I ...................... 212 "
I ...................... 212
I ...................... 235
2 ...................... 236 "
I ...................... 247 "
I ...................... 278 "
I ...................... 286 "
I ...................... 291 "
I ...................... 339
48 Total days... 6196
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TABLE V.
Froin Appeal to Argument
No. Cases. Time.
2........................ i8 days.
I...................... 21
I...................... 26
3 ...................... 28
4 ...................... 31
2 ...................... 32
6 ...................... 33
2 ......................... 3
2 ........................ 46
I...................... 5
I...................... 53
2 ...................... 54
i...................... 56
I........ .............. 59
I ...................... 64 "
I....................... 67
I...................... .6
I...................... 79 c
...................... 81 c
I...................... 93
I...................... 94
2...................... 96
2 ...................... I0o
I ...................... 104
I ...................... Iog
I ............ 8.......... 11
I ...................... 126
I ...................... 133
I ...................... 138
I ...................... 147
I ...................... 152 c
I ...................... 211
I ......................245
49 ' Total days...3375
TABLE VI.
Fron Argument to Decision.
No. Cases. Time.
I...................... 6 days.
5...................... 7
9...................... 14
3 ...................... I6
2 ........................ I8
2 ...................... 20
4 ...................... 21
I ...................... 27 "
3 ...................... 28
I ...................... 30
I ...................... 34
I ...................... 36
3 ...................... 37
I ...................... 42
7 ......... ! ............ 49 "
I ...................... 55 "
3 ...................... 56 "
I ...................... 63 "
2...................... 64 "
I...................... 77 "
52 Total days ....... 573
